Sfc^% POLICY OF ENGLAND 
AND FRANCE /^ 

■/ 



IN REFERVNCi; TO /" ^ ••'// 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS^'' 



CHAPTER XA'ill of THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



JUSTIN PL SMITH 



Author of The Troubadours at Honw, G'.r Struggle for iLe Fourte:-hh Colony, 

Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec, etc. 

Recently Professor of Modern History in Dartviouth College 



NEW YORK 
THE BAKER & TAYLOR CO. 







aass_JE133_0_ 



THE ^ 

ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 




BY 



JUSTIN H. SMITH 



al'thor of the troubadours at home, our struggle for the fourteenth colonv. 

Arnold's march from Cambridge to Quebec, etc.; 

recently professor of modern history in dartmouth collecie 



NEW YORK 
THE BAKER AND TAYLOR CO. 
1911 






Copyright, 1911 
By Justin H. Smith 



Press of 

The New Era Printing Company 

Lancaster. Pa 






TO THE MEMORY OF 



DR. GEORGE PIERCE GARRISON 



ALL THOSE OTHER SCHOLARS WHOSE INVESTIGATIONS HAVE 
THROWN LIGHT UPON THE HISTORY OF TEXAS 



THIS VOLUME IS WITH GREAT RESPECT 



INSCRIBED 



PREFACE. 

The annexation of Texas, it can justly be said, was a very inter- 
esting, important, complicated and critical affair. It involved issues 
and consequences of no little moment in our domestic politics. It 
gave us an area greater than England and France together, with a 
port that ranks very near the head of our list, and paved the way 
for the acquisition of San Francisco and our far Southwest. It 
led to our greatest and most brilliant foreign war. It extinguished 
a nation that might have become a strong and unfriendly rival and 
might have caused the disruption of the Union. It removed an 
excellent opportunity for certain leading European powers to inter- 
pose in the affairs of this continent and in particular to embarrass 
the development of the United States. It presented a field of battle 
on which our diplomats and those of England, France, Mexico and 
Texas waged a long and intricate struggle with all their skill and 
with a full determination to succeed ; and it brought these five na- 
tions to the verge of war. Such an episode would appear to merit 
a detailed study, especially since very different opinions regarding 
it still prevail ; and as the author, while gathering data for a history 
of our Mexican War, found many essential materials for a thorough 
treatment of the subject, he has felt under obligation to complete 
and present them. 

As the footnotes indicate, the monograph is based almost ex- 
clusively (with the exception of certain preliminary matters) on 
first-hand sources, though all previous works of any importance on 
the subject have been fully examined. Use has been made of sub- 
stantially all the diplomatic papers — American, British, French, 
Mexican and Texan — bearing upon the question, and also, as may 
be seen by the account of the Sources in the Appendix, a rather 
large amount of other valuable material both manuscript and printed, 
such as executive and legislative documents, letters, speeches, diaries 
and periodicals. All discoverable sources of information, indeed, 
have been examined. In this way a closer approach to complete- 
ness has been attainable, and at the same time it has been possible 
to avoid errors into which a writer depending upon a portion of the 
data would not infrequently fall without even suspecting danger. 



VI PREFACE. 

Secondly, by making a painstaking study of public opinion in the 
countries chiefly concerned it has been feasible to ascertain the 
causes which controlled or influenced official action in certain impor- 
tant cases. Thirdly, attention has been paid to a number of sub- 
sidiary topics which throw a strong light upon the subject. Such 
are the British designs with reference to slavery in Texas and the 
United States, the political condition of northern Mexico at tliis 
period, the possibilities before Texas as an independent nation, the 
danger to the United States involved in her permanent nationality, 
the scheme of a new confederacy, the status and influence of the 
annexation issue in the politics of this country, and several others. 
Fourthly, the desire has been to avoid leaving the matter, as it is 
easy to do when using first-hand sources, in such a condition that the 
reader could not see the forest for the trees. And finally a strong 
and long-continued efifort has been made to secure not only complete- 
ness but accuracy. Of course perfection has not been reached, 
however, and it is hoped that all mistakes may be pointed out. The 
truth of history is surely more important than a writer's dream of an 
impossible inerrancy, and serious criticism, based upon knowledge, 
is co-operation of a most useful kind. 

Those who were pleased to commend the style of the author's 
latest work, Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony, may feel sur- 
prised that the present volume is so different. It seems to him 
clear, however, that one's manner of writing should depend on one's 
subject and object. In the former case his dominant theme was 
the early, impulsive stage of a popular revolution in the name of 
Liberty, and his principal business was to recount the out-door 
proceedings — often peculiarly dramatic and exciting — of ardent and 
frequently somewhat crude young men ; whereas at present his 
concern is with diplomats and statesmen pursuing with dignity and 
deliberation their profoundly studied lines of policy. The earlier 
book, in order to make the extraordinary facts entirely compre- 
hensible to minds quite unfamiliar with such a state of things, en- 
deavored to place its readers in the thick of events and impart in 
some degree a sense of the agitation and enthusiasm of the time, 
to which end a vivid and rather highly colored style, answering to 
the character of the persons and events presented, seemed appro- 
priate and even necessary ; but now one is occupied with complicated 
intellectual efforts of a high order, which are best viewed from an 



PREFACE. Vn 

elevation and a distance; and these require only to be made known 
as clearly, calmly and unobtrusively as possible. 

The footnotes cover all the statements of the text except a few 
matters of common knowledge, but of course a fact once proved is 
not proved again. To some readers the number of references will 
seem unnecessarily great, and so they appear to the author himself. 
But as almost every foot of the ground is controversial, the per- 
centage that could safely be omitted is rather small, and the saving 
would hardly justify the abandonment of a complete and logical 
system for one of the opposite character. In order not to fill the 
page with annoying figures, the references — standing in the order 
of the statements they support — are grouped by paragraphs, and an 
indication of the bearing of the reference is given when this is not 
obvious. Naturally in some cases a citation confirms more than a 
single sentence, and it should be remembered, too, that for reasons 
of convenience the first page of a document is the one specified 
unless there is a particular occasion for doing otherwise. To carry 
such a body of figures with perfect accuracy through the processes 
of compiling, revising, copying and printing is extremely difficult, 
especially as the author's attention is liable to be diverted momen- 
tarily from the mathematics to the meaning of the citation ; but it 
can be said that unsparing pains have been taken to ensure correct- 
ness, and that a trained historical worker has gone over the entire 
work of verification independently. 

While engaged on this investigation at the Public Record Office, 
London, the author was so fortunate as to have for neighbor Dr. 
Ephraim Douglass Adams, the fruit of whose researches, covering 
to a small extent the same ground as this volume, has recently been 
ofifered to the public. As it fell to the present writer in another 
place to view that monograph, Britisli Interests and Activities in 
Texas, in the manner which it invited by describing itself as " purely 
technical," he will only say here — though it does not need to be 
said — that anything coming from such a source deserves very care- 
ful attention, and express the hope that all concerned with Texan 
history will read the book. One cannot help wishing that Professor 
Adams's investigations had extended to the Texan, Mexican and 
American archives. Mention must also be made of an interesting 
and valuable work by Dr. Jesse S. Reeves, entitled American Diplo- 
macy imder Tyler and Polk, based largely on documents which he 
as well as the present writer was permitted to examine at the State 



Viii PREFACE. 

Department, Washington. Neither of these volumes, it is proper to 
add. was read by the author of The Annexation of Texas until 
after the completion of his own manuscript. In this place, too, the 
important investigations conducted by a number of Texan scholars 
and made known to the public in various learned periodicals, notably 
the Quarterly of their State Historical Association, are entitled to a 
grateful and very respectful recognition. 

Finally the author desires to acknowledge with the highest appre- 
ciation the indispensable assistance of President Roosevelt, Presi- 
dent Diaz, Secretary of State Root, Minister of Foreign Relations 
Mariscal, Senator Lodge, and Ambassadors Reid at London, White 
at Paris and Clayton at Mexico; and to express a warm sense of 
obligation to his distinguished friends Dr. J. Franklin Jameson, Mr. 
Worthington C. Ford and Mr. Gaillard Hunt for aid in his search 
for documents. To the many others who have kindly co-operated 
in minor yet important ways, particularly by granting permission 
to examine the MSS. in their custody, his thanks are likewise very 
cordially tendered. 

J. H. S. 

Boston, July 26, 191 1. 



CONTENTS. 

I. The Beginnings of the Annexation Question ... i 

II. Texas and Mexico, 1836-1843 34 

III. Texas and the United States, 1836-1843 52 

IV. Texas and Europe, 1836-1843 76 

V. Tyler Desires to Effect Annexation loi 

VI. Tyler Proposes Annexation 116 

VII. Foreshadowings of the Annexation Struggle .... 130 

VIII. The Annexation Treaty is Negotiated 147 

IX. The Annexation Issue is Placed before the 

Country 180 

X. The Administration Changes Front 194 

XI. The Negotiations are Made Public 221 

XII. The Annexation Question is Thrown into Politics 234 

XIII. The Fate of the Treaty 258 

XIV. The Issue is Re-shaped 281 

XV. The Annexation Question in the Presidential 

Campaign 297 

XVI. Annexation is Offered to Texas 322 

XVII. The Attitude of Rejected Texas 356 

XVIII. The Policy of England and France in Reference 

TO the Annexation of Texas 382 

XIX. The Annexation Question before Mexico 414 

XX. The Crisis 432 

XXI. Annexation is Consummated 462 



IX 



XVIII 

The Policy of England and France in Reference to the An- 
nexation OF Texas 

As early as April. 1830, JMexico drew England's attention to 
Texas, and mentioned in particular the desire of the United States 
to obtain it. Gorostiza, her minister at London, had a formal inter- 
view with Aberdeen, declared that his country " would never volun- 
tarily consent " to the cession of the province, and expressed a wish 
to know the feeling of Great Britain on the subject. His Lordship, 
indeed, had already said that " the severing of a part of the Mexican 
territory would be of general significance, and could not suit the 
interests of England," but Mexico now desired something more ex- 
plicit. To this Aberdeen replied that Great Britain felt deeply con- 
cerned about the matter. He did not believe the United States, 
however anxious to possess this important region, entertained hostile 
intentions against the owners of it; but he asked Gorostiza to call 
at any hour when he should have cause to suspect the existence of 
such designs.^ 

As it has already been suggested, there were ample reasons why 
Great Britain should oppose our acquiring Texas. The area, wealth 
and population of the Lhiited States would be increased ; the danger 
of our absorbing also the Mexican republic, where England had 
large interests, would become more imminent; and our hold upon 
the Gulf of Mexico would be strengthened. At the same time Great 
Britain would lose the priceless advantage of possessing a source of 
cotton supply outside of the United States and the profitable oppor- 
tunity to land merchandise at Galveston, under a low rate of duties, 
not only for the Texas market but for illicit introduction into the 
adjacent portions of two high tariff countries. There was also 
another ground of objection probably. Besides extending American 
slavery, annexation would reinforce it; and both of these results 
were contrary to British policy. - 

* See General Note, p. i. Gorostiza to Relac., No. lo (res.). Aoril 22, 1830: 
Sria. Relac. 

- According to the best English opinion, the annexation of Texas to the United 
States was quite liable to be followed by the annexation of Mexico. Pakenham, 
long minister to Mexico, wrote to the British Foreign Office (No. 22, April 14, 

382 



383 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

In October, 1843, Elliot was shown the despatch from Van Zandt 
which announced that the American government had informally but 
earnestly suggested union to Texas ; and in December Fox, the quiet 
but watchful British minister at Washington, called the attention of 
the Foreign Office to portions of Tyler's annual Message which he 
thought pointed in that direction. Lord Aberdeen, believing that 
Houston desired the maintenance of nationality seems to have been 
confident that no favor would be shown to such a proposal by 
his administration, and therefore had seen little danger ; but the 
President's Message and the report from Elliot aroused him consid- 
erably, it is probable, for on the ninth of January, 1844, he addressed 
a note on the subject to Pakenham, who had now been transferred 
from Mexico to Washington. /\t about this time Ashbel Smith, the 
Texan charge, was in Paris. There he discussed with Guizot the 
interests of his nation ; and then, going to London, he conferred with 
Aberdeen. As a result of these interviews — if Guizot was right in 
what he stated to the Chamber of Deputies — His Lordship addressed 
a letter on the twelfth of January to the British ambassador at Paris. 
In this he said that it appeared "sufficiently evident [from Tyler's 
remarks] that the future annexation of Texas " to the United States 
was "contemplated by the President " ; that the government of Louis 
Philippe had recognized the' new republic, anrl "the Interests of the 
two Countries [Fngland and France] in that part of America were, 
in all respects, the same " ; and that consequently he presumed that 
France, like England. " would not . . . look with indifference upon 
any measure, by which Texas should cease to exist as a separate 
and independent State." He therefore instructed Cowley to ascer- 
tain whether the cabinet of His Majesty shared these views, and in 
that case to " propose that the Representatives of the two Govern- 
ments at Washington and in Texas, should be instructed to hold the 
same Language ; deprecating all interference on the part of the 
United States in the affairs of Texas, or the adoption of any measure 
tending to the destruction of the separate existence of that State; 
at the same time, warning the Texian Government not to furnish the 
United States with any just cause of Complaint, and encouraging 
them to look to the preservation of their independence, as the best 
security for their ultimate prosperity, both political and commercial."^ 

1844: F. O., America, cdiv.) : "it may be feared that if the present project [the 
annexation of Texas] should unfortunately take effect, the Independence of 
Mexico will cease to be worth many years purchase." 

^Elliot, secret, Oct. 31, 1843. Fox, Dec. 13, 1843. (Believing) Smith. No. 55. 
June 2, 1844. To Pak., No. i, Jan. 9, 1844. (Guizot) Le Nat., Feb. 2, i€^6 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 384 

Three days later Cowley replied that on a recent visit at the 
Tuileries, before these instructions had reached him, the King him- 
self had broached the subject, remarking that it appeared from the 
President's Message as if the United States intended to bring about 
annexation, a point of no slight importance ; that the scheme ought 
to be opposed ; and that Guizot had been desired to open negotiations 
on the matter with Her Majesty's government. It was therefore 
not surprising that when the despatch of January 12 was made 
known to Guizot, he entirely concurred in its views, replied that 
Sainte Aulaire, the French ambassador at London, would be in- 
structed at once to confer with Aberdeen, and Pageot, the minister 
at Washington, to act in strict concert with Pakenham, and re- 
marked further that he personally thought it of importance to 
oppose the designs of the United States in this matter. On the 
twenty-ninth of the month the instructions to Saint Aulaire were 
actually issued, and in them Guizot went so far as to say, " It would 
not suit us under any consideration to accept without protest such 
a change " as the absorption of Texas. The instructions to Pageot 
were dated February 10, and he was told to inform the government 
of the United States clearly that even should the people of that 
republic wish to be annexed, France " could not view such an event 
(fait) with indifference." Thus the concert of the two powers on 
the subject was inaugurated.* 

To understand why Louis Philippe embarked upon this course, 
it is necessary to study the matter somewhat carefully. In July, 
1836, Cuevas, the Mexican minister at Paris, reporting that a war 
between Mexico and the American LTnion was generally believed 
there to have begun, said he did not doubt '' for a moment " that his 
country would receive from France and England " all the support 
which their commerce with Mexico, their ardent desire to check 
the aggressive {invasora) policy of the United States and the justice 
of the Mexican cause demanded " ; and from this it may be inferred 
what ideas he was endeavoring to inculcate. Two months later the 
Alexican department of foreign relations instructed him '" to secure 
by all possible means the rectification of public opinion " in France, 
which it was feared that accounts of the atrocities perpetrated in 
Texas would affect. Cuevas had anticipated this order. In [ulv 

(This trip to London does not appear in Smith's reports). To Cowley, Xo. i6, 
Jan. 12, 1844. A copy of this despatch was sent to Elliot, Jan. 31, JS44. 

* Cowley, Jan. 15, 1844. To Ste. Aulaire, Jan. 29, 1844: Le Const.. Jan. 12, 
1846. To Pageot, Feb. 10, 1844: ib. 



385 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

La Prcsse of Paris had contained an article, the basis of which had 
been furnished by him, declaring that the United States had " inher- 
ited the ancient Punic faith of England," and that in the eyes of the 
great American republic " all means were good." Cuevas had 
already enlisted the Journal des Dehats also in his campaign, and in 
Julv that paper had printed an article on the United States especially 
designed to bring odium upon this country for tolerating slavery. 
After receiving his orders to influence public opinion it may be 
assumed that the minister did not relax his efforts ; and his successor 
brought out and distributed the following year large numbers of the 
pamphlet prepared by Gorostiza, which attributed to the United 
States an improper and encroaching policy in the Texas affair. 
Diplomats, journalists and government officials were the persons he 
endeavored to instruct in this way, and he believed that his exertions 
were not without success." 

By these methods very likely the French government were some- 
what stimulated to regard the aims of the United States as ambitious 
and aggressive ; and, in addition to such promptings, Louis Philippe 
had ample reasons for desiring to prevent the annexation of Texas. As 
a monarch, he could not look with favor upon the development of a 
powerful republic. Royalty was his trade. The time had gone by 
when he had thought it for his interest to flatter democrats, and 
now he feared and detested them. He was " every inch a King," 
said our representative at his court in suggesting this explanation of 
his conduct. Moreover, as a sovereign by the right of revolution he 
found himself isolated in Europe, his government, said the Amer- 
ican minister, having " never been viewed with a favorable eye by the 
great continental monarchies." It was England that had taken the 
lead in acknowledging him, and England, he felt, was still his " main 
stay." Threatened every moment, not only by this legitimist ill- 
will but by the strong revolutionary tendencies of France and Europe, 
it was upon British support that he counted to maintain that peace 
among the nations and the peoples which he deemed essential to the 
security of his dynasty and the prosperity of France; and, besides 
wishing to oblige his almost indispensable neighbor, he could see 
that the two countries, having somewhat similar interests in the 
Texas aff'air, would naturally be drawn together by joint action 

= Cuevas to Relac, No. 67, July 13, 1836: Sria. Relac. Relac. to Cuevas, No. 
102, Sept. 12, 1836. La Presse. July 5. 1836. Debats, July 12, 1836. Mangino 
to Relac, No. 28. July 13, 1837: Sria. Relac. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 386 

regarding it. Moreover he desired in particular to earn the assent 
of England to the marriage of Montpensier and the Infanta.*' 

As a Latin, too, the King could not rejoice in the upbuilding of 
a great " Anglo-Saxon " power in America. As a Bourbon he was 
peculiarly tenacious of the family compact idea, and he well under- 
stood that in case of the failure of the direct line the French branch 
would inherit a claim to Spain and all Spanish America. As a mem- 
ber of the Orleans house, if Le National of Paris was right, he had 
Inherited the policy of favoring England. As a believer in the bal- 
ance of power, he felt opposed to the existence of any greatly pre- 
ponderant nation in the western hemisphere ; and in particular he 
was keenly alive to the danger that our neighbor on the south might 
suffer from American encroachments. Indeed, he told the Mexican 
minister explicitly in July, 1844, that the ambition of the United 
States would not be satisfied with Texas, but " would follow its 
aggressive system at the expense of Mexico unless a strong barrier 
were immediately established between the two countries " ; and he 
dwelt on the same point in his conversation with Cowley.'' 

Moreover, France had recognized Texas in the expectation of 
securing commercial benefits ; and while as yet almost nothing had 
been accomplished — two vessels carrying all the trade in 1845 — there 
were still opportunities and hopes, especially as a former French 
colonist in Texas felt able to say that the French-speaking element 
there was the strongest except the American, and that the tastes and 
habits of the people made them like French goods. It was, besides, 
a point of pride to save a power which His Majesty had acknowl- 
edged as independent from being swallowed up by another nation. 
In fact, after recognizing Texas the King had logically desired from 
the first that her nationality become real, and as early as May, 1841, 
the following curious dialogue had occurred between him and the 
Mexican representative at his court. 

"Have you news from Mexico?" inquired His Majesty. 

"I have recently received quite satisfactory news," replied Garro. 

" The country is at peace ? You believe. Monsieur Garro, that 
there will be no war? " 

" That is my hope. Sire." 

" I am glad, for you know that I do not like war, which is a 
great evil." 

"King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844: No. 21. Jan. i, 1846. Martin, No. 17. Aug. 15, 
1845. Bancroft to Polk, Nov. 3, 1846: Bancroft Pap. 

' (Claim) London Atlas, Aug. 16, 1845. Le Nat:, Jan. 27, 1845. Garro, No. 
IS (res.), July 4. 1844. Cowley, Jan. 15, 1844. 



387 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

" Certainly, Sire." 

" So there will be no war ? That is best. Still, you have not 
made a treaty of peace yet." 

" Sire, I misunderstood Your Majesty and thought you spoke 
of civil war. Our war with Texas the Republic is resolved to 
continue." 

" The Spanish pronounce the name Tecas and not Tccsas, do 
they not?" 

" Certainly."^ 

Guizot shared most of these ideas more or less strongly, no 
doubt. The new republic, he said later in the Chamber of Deputies, 
had been recognized in order to obtain raw materials on better terms 
than the United States would give, to secure lower duties than the 
American rates, to acquire valuable markets, and to avoid the annoy- 
ance of sending French merchandise to Galveston by way of New 
York. Still more strongly he dwelt upon the idea of a balance of 
power in America, and his letter to Pageot urged the value of Texas 
as a barrier against us. In the same despatch he insisted that it was 
due to the dignity of France that the national standing of that coun- 
try be respected ; and for commercial as well as political interests he 
considered it an important principle that independent states remain 
separate.® 

There were also other reasons. Naturally he was under an 
obligation to comply with His Majesty's wishes. He felt, said 
Edward Everett, that " without the good will of the present British 
Government his own would sink." In particular there was no little 
dissatisfaction in France on account of the right of search that had 
been conceded to English cruisers with a view to the suppression of 
the slave trade ; the minister desired to have the great credit of secur- 
ing a modification of the agreement, as he actually did in 1845 ! ^^^ 
Everett, like many French politicians, believed that he was disposed 
to gratify his neighbor in the Texas matter in order to secure this 
favor in return. Indeed, Thiers asserted flatly in the Chamber of 
Deputies that France adopted the English policy in this business in 
order to buy back the right of visit. ^"^ 

It is very likely, too, that Guizot thought the matter a small one. 

* King, No. I, July 13, 1844. (Vessels) Billault in Chamber of Deputies: 
Le Nat., Jan. 22, 1846. Revue de Paris, March 18, 1845. Garro, No. 7 (res.), 
May ID, 1845. 

'Everett, No. 331, June 17, 1845. Dcbats. Jan. 23, 1846. To Pageot, Feb. 
10, 1844: Le Const., Jan. 12, 1846. 

'"Everett, private, Feb. 26, 1845. London Journ. Com., June 7, 1845. Revue 
de Paris, Feb. 15, 1845. (Thiers) Dcbats, Jan. 21, 1846. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 388 

Pageot had written about it in at least three despatches during 1843, 
asserted Berryer, without rousing any particular interest in the 
French foreign office. Probably the chief minister did not imagine 
that anything more than diplomatic operations would be called 
for. His expectation was, our representative thought, that Clay 
would be elected President in 1844, and the question of annexation 
be dropped. The reports of his agents that the Texan people did not 
wish to be absorbed, drew him in the same direction ; and in his 
despatch to Pageot he stated that the opposition against the annexa- 
tion of that country was based primarily upon the supposed unwil- 
lingness of her citizens to join the United States. In short, for all 
these reasons he believed that no harm could result from meddling, 
that he could thus accumulate merit with England, that he could 
please his master, and that he could strengthen both his own admin- 
istration and the national interests. Accordingly, though the French 
government cared intrinsically much less about the matter than did 
the English, it was determined to protest formally against the 
absorption of Texas, and after some delay instructions to that effect 
were received by Pageot. ^^ 

They arrived at about the time Calhoun signed the annexation 
treaty, and the ministers of England and France, who had already 
conferred on the subject, again took counsel together. Pakenham, 
though not authorized to go as far as his colleague, had already 
remonstrated against the project in plain terms, and he would have 
felt justified now in uniting with Pageot in a formal protest, had he 
thought such a step would have " the effect of arresting the progress 
of the mischief " ; but, he reported, " I agreed with M. Pageot in Lr 
the opinion that a simple protest on our part, unsupported by an 
intimation of more decisive measures of resistance — and this intima- 
tion neither of us were authorized to make — would have been quite 
insufficient to arrest the evil intentions of this Government." On 
the other hand, by arousing a popular outcry it might weaken the 
anti-annexation strength in the Senate, and would certainly — should 
the measure be consummated — render the position of England and 
France as passive witnesses the more " unpleasant." Consequently 
it was agreed by the two diplomats that no protest should be made.^- 

" (Pageot) Berryer: Debats, Jan. 31, 1846. King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. 
To Pageot: Note 9. King, No. 25, Jan. 30, 1846. Smith, No. 55. June 2, 1844. 
(Cared less) Id., July i, 1844: Jones, Memor., 369. (Instructions) Pak., No. 
22, April 14, 1844. The truth about the protest was studiously concealed, and all 
kinds of assertions and conjectures in reference to it are to be met with. 

'- Pak., No. 22, April 14, 1844. 



389 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



At the end of March Pakenham had reported from Washington 
that he believed an annexation treaty was to be concluded " as soon 
as a certain General Henderson supposed to be now on his way from 
Texas " should arrive ; and about the middle of the following month 
he sent word that he was " assured " the treaty had been signed. 
It then occurred to the British government that perhaps these pro- 
ceedings could be checked by an appeal to international law% and on 
May 13 the opinion of Her Majesty's Advocate General was re- 
quested. With startling promptness Mr. Dodson replied only two 
days later. A state recognized as independent has the right, he 
said, to " divest Itself " of sovereignty by a treaty of annexation 
although it has made treaties with other nations, unless it has engaged 
not to do so, and even in that case is at liberty to take such a step if 
constrained by " an over ruling necessity." Little comfort could be 
derived from this opinion. In diplomacy therefore appeared to lie 
the best hope ; and three days afterwards Pakenham was informed 
that immediate and anxious attention would be given to the subject.^^ 

This bore fruit within a fortnight in an interview with Murphy, 
the Mexican representative at London, and in a Memorandum of 
the conversation drawn up by him in French and modified by Aber- 
deen in English, the essential part of which ran as follows,— italics 
representing the modifications : 

" Lord Aberdeen expressed a wish to see Mexico acknowledge the 
independence of Texas. 'If Mexico,' he said, 'will concede this point, 
England (and I have reason to believe that France will join with her in 
this determination) will oppose the annexation of Texas and moreover 
he would endeavour that France and England will unite in guaranteeing 
not only the independence of Texas, but also the boundary of Mexico. 
On the other hand should Mexico persist in declining to recognize 
Texas, the intentions of England to prevent the annexation of that 
country to the United States might not be put in execution.' Upon my 
remarking that it was not at all probable the American Government 
would be willing to drop the annexation affair, even should the Amer- 
ican Senate reject the Treaty for the present. Lord Aberdeen replied 
that provided that England and France were perfectly agreed, ' it would 
matter little to England whether the American Government should be 
willing to drop this question or not, and that, should it be necessary, she 
would go to the last extremity [jusqu' aux dernieres extremites] in 
support of her opposition to the annexation ; but that for this purpose it 
was essential that Mexico be disposed to acknowledge the independence 

" Pak., No. 16, March 28; No. 22, April 14, 1844. Dodson to Aberdeen, 
May 15, 1844: F. O.. Texas, xi. To Pak., No. 21. May 18, 1844. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 39O 

of Texas,' " because otherwise an agreement in policy between her and 
England would be impossible. 

Such was the fully attested report of this interview. It indicated 
clearly that war with United States w:as contemplated, and Murphy 
was not only authorized but expected to place it before Santa Anna.^* 

A few days later a despatch was addressed to the British repre- 
sentative at Paris, and this was followed very shortly by one to 
Bankhead, accompanied by copies of the Murphy Memorandum 
and the despatch to Cowley. " You will therein see," wrote Aber- 
deen to his agent at Mexico, " that we have submitted a proposition 
to the French Government for a joint operation on the part of Great 
Britain and France in order to induce Mexico to acknowledge the 
independence of Texas, on a guarantee being jointly given by us 
that that independence shall be respected by other Nations, and that 
the Mexico-Texian boundary shall be secured from future encroach- 
ment. Should France assent to this proposal, we propose to send 
out forthwith a fit person to Texas, in the imavoidable absence of 
Captain Elliot," to ascertain whether on such a basis the people of 
that country would prefer independence to annexation, as it is be- 
lieved they would. In case our impression on this point is found 
to be correct, " we shall then take measures forthwith for operating 
directly and officially upon the ^Mexican Government," which we 
hope to find " amenable to our views. . . . Should they, however, 
refuse their assent, or still demur to the acknowledgment of Texas, 
it will be for England and France to take such further measures for 
attaining the desired object as they may deem expedient," — in other 
words, one may fairly understand His Lordship to mean, the purpose 
would not be abandoned. ^^ 

Aberdeen learned from Pakenham, soon after the annexation 
treaty was presented to the Senate, that " the whole strength of Mr. 
Clay's party " would be thrown against it, and no doubt he perceived 
that its rejection was thus ensured ; but he felt surprised that Houston, 
after professing so earnestly to desire the maintenance of a national 
position, had suddenly taken up that project, and for this or some 

" Memo. : F. O.. Mexico, clxxx. The interview was on May 28 or 29. To 
Bank., No. 16, conf., June 3, 1844. It should be noted that the Memo, rvithout the 
italicized words represents Aberdeen's ideas as Murphy understood them, and 
these words perhaps indicate merely the prudent reserve with which Aberdeen 
would naturally desire to speak to Mexico regarding the action of France. 

"To Cowley. May 31, 1844. To Bank., No. 16, conf., June 3, 1844. Aber- 
deen intimated to Smith (Smith, No. 55, June 2, 1844) that England and France 
were prepared to use force upon Mexico. 



391 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Other reason he showed considerable reserve in talking with Ashbel 
Smith, saying little for a time about his intentions or the moves 
of the powers, whereas Louis Philippe informed the Texan envoy 
plainly that France desired a joint and authoritative interposition 
of the two nations. On the first of June, however, Smith explained 
to him that public feeling had been too strong for the President, and 
said it was his own opinion that if Mexico would recognize his 
country and Spain would enable her to trade with Cuba by making 
a commercial treaty, her people might not care to join the United 
States. Partially reassured, Aberdeen intimated that perhaps the 
recognition could be brought about, but he still felt much anxiety 
regarding the attitude of Texas. ^° • 

Three weeks later, however, he laid aside his reserve, and an- 
nounced that when the annexation treaty should have been rejected, 
England and France would be willing to unite with Texas, the United 
States and Mexico in a Diplomatic Act. This Act was to be equiva- 
lent to a perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition and peace, 
but preventing her from ever acquiring territory beyond the Rio 
Grande or joining the American Union. Mexico, he said, would be 
forced into acquiescence in case she should be unwilling to join, and 
it was not expected that the United States would take part. Later 
Ashbel Smith said of this plan : " The terms, effect and possible con- 
sequences to the several parties to it [including, of course, a possible 
war], were maturely considered, fully discussed and clearly under- 
stood between Lord Aberdeen and the minister of Texas." Both 
Louis Philippe and Guizot stated that France would join in the 
Act ; and President Houston, on learning of the proposition, not 
only directed Jones verbally several times to accept it, but finally 
wrote to him with his own hand this order: " Let our representatives 
be instructed to complete the proposed arrangement for the settle- 
ment of our Mexican dit^culties, as soon as possible — giving the 
necessary pledges [that Texas would never consent to join the United 
States, explains Jones in a note], as suggested in the late dispatch 
of Dr. Smith on this subject."'' 

^*Pak., No. 36, April 28, 1844. Smith, No. 55, June 2, 1844. 

" England and France dared make no move toward settling the Texan affair 
while the treaty was pending, lest it should become known and cause an in- 
flamed public sentiment in the United States to insist upon the ratification of 
the treaty (Jones to Miller, May 3, 1844: Miller Pap.). Smith, Nos. 55, 57, 
June 2, 24, 1844. Id., Remin., 61, 62. The Act contemplated war not only with 
Mexico but with the United States, for a demand to bring Texas by force into 
the Union would certainly have arisen here, and it would have been incumbent 
upon England and France to protect her independence against us if force were 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 392 

Now it is quite certain that Great Britain desired to be on friendly 
terms with this country. As far back as 1828 her minister in Mexico 
had been expressly notified of this wish, and ordered to " entirely 
abstain from professing or inculcating a hostile feeling '" toward us. 
In 1836, while Mexico was extremely angry with her neighbor on 
the north, care was taken by the British minister at that post, under 
instructions from his government, to avoid encouraging the idea that 
any aid against us could be expected from England, or that she " might 
be induced from a feeling of good will towards Mexico to take any 
step of a nature to give umbrage to the Government of the United 
States"; and in June, 1842, referring to rumors that Great Britain 
was encouraging Mexico, Pakenham wrote that " So far from acting 
in a sense so little likely to be approved by Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment," he had urged the Mexican authorities to satisfy our just 
demands.^® 

In fact, England could not afford to fight this country, and she 
knew it. The amount of her capital engaged in commerce with 
the United States was described by Aberdeen himself as "vast." 
The value of British exports to the American market can be seen 
from the fact that three years later, according to Lord Bentinck, 
twenty out of the twenty-eight million dollars of the United States 
customs revenvie were derived from British goods ; while an article 
in the New York Journal of Commerce showed that England pur- 
chased $16,000,000 worth of our products more than we received 
from her. Moreover, said the London Mercantile Journal in 1844, 
the only American import that England could do without was to- 
used. Xote what Pakenham and Pageot said (paragraph 22,) about the action 
that would be taken by the United States in case England and France should 
undertake to ensure the independence of Texas. (Verbally) Jones, Memor., 43. 
Houston to Jones, Sept. 22. 1844: Niles., Ixxiv., 413. Jones (Memor., 59) says 
that under the Diplomatic Act France would have been willing to fight in order 
to prevent annexation. By July ig, Calhoun received information, in which he 
placed the most implicit confidence, that England, aided (it was said) by France, 
intended to force Mexico to recognize Texas on the condition that Texas would 
remain independent (Lewis to Jackson, July ig, 1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville 
Coll.). How Houston reconciled his order with his hopes of Texan expansion 
is a mystery. Possibly, feeling that he had better make sure of the essential, 
he decided to sacrifice those hopes ; but more probably he had some scheme in 
mind. It is noticeable that whereas England and France intended to prevent 
Texas from either joining the U. S. or crossing the Rio Grande, his order con- 
templated (according to Jones) only the first of these limitations. The order 
as printed mentions Smith and Daingerfield as the Texas representatives, but 
the names may have been inserted by Tones as explanatory. 

^'To Pak.. April 21, 18-8. E. g.. Pak., No. 42, May 27, 1836; No. 4g, June 
2. 184-. 



393 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



bacco, and the others amounted to ahnost $65,000,000. According 
to that authority, tlie United States took about '$4,000,000 in cotton 
manufactures alone, and nearly $6,000,000 in woolens. The London 
Econojuist well described the two countries as commercial comple- 
ments. Now not only would England lose her trade with us during 
the period of conflict but, as Le Corrcspondaiit of Paris remarked, 
we should be stimulated meanwhile to set up manufacturing estab- 
lishments of our own, and British mill-owners and merchants, ruined 
by the suspension of their trade, would be likely to cross the sea and 
conduct their business here. Early in 1844 the Liverpool Mercury 
declared that a war with the United States, even if successful, 
" would be a calamity of a most fatal description." In March, 1845, 
when the danger of trouble over the Oregon question seemed real, 
the unsentimental Economist drew a most vivid and startling picture 
of the harm that would result; and all of these considerations were 
equally forcible a little earlier. Moreover, an income tax to me^t the 
deficit in revenue was already necessary.^" 

England was hampered also by the complications of her foreign 
policy in India, China, Africa and Oceanica, and she was even more 
embarrassed by the condition of Ireland. In May, 1845, the London 
Examiner said, "The popular press [of that country] teems with 
the worst sort of treason ; . . . a treason ready to league with any 
foreign foe." The same month Peel himself intimated in Parlia- 
ment that in case of a conflict with the United States the Irish might 
cause serious difficulties; and the London Atlas remarked that some 
of their journals contemplated, "with a sort of savage satisfaction, 
not only the prospect of a war, but the probability of Ireland's 
uniting with the enemies " of Great Britain. Trouble was scented 
from another source also. The Atlas admitted that "the republi- 
cans of Canada " plainl}- indicated " an intention of throwing over- 
board their allegiance whenever an army of 50,000 repealers [of the 
union between Ireland and England] should choose to cross the 
Canadian borders." Moreover the continent was at this time a 
smouldering volcano preparing for the eruptions of 1848; and the 
United States consul at Bremen wrote to Calhoun that the Roths- 
childs would not permit any European power to go to war in 

'"To Elliot, No. 10, July 3, 1845. (Bentinck) London Times, Nov. 25, 1847. 
N. Y. Journ. Com.: Britannia, Oct. 19, 1844. Mercantile Journ., Aug. 26, 1844. 
Economist, Sept. 13, 1845. Le Correspondant, Jan. i, 1846. Mercury: Nat. Intell., 
May 9, 1844. Economist. March 28, 1845. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 394 

America, since the consequence would be a series of revolutions 
near home.-'' 

Still further, it would have been absurd to fight the United States 
on the Texas question, when England was pursuing a course of high- 
handed aggression abroad. In April, 1844, the Atlas protested 
against the policy of the government as follows : 

" It is somewhat far-fetched to ground our operations [against 
Gwalior] upon an old treaty for the maintenance of a prince, because 
his regent was obnoxious to us, when that very prince, and his whole 
army and people, not only declined the assistance of their soi-disant 
allies, but opposed them with their whole force. It is, in fact, the his- 
tory of all our Indian aggressions. We first enter into a treaty for the 
support of some particular family or dynasty, in the full certainty that, 
amidst the intrigues and revolutions which occur in oriental despotisms, 
we shall be called upon to interfere, and then we claim the whole 
heritage for ourselves." 

What looked yet worse, England had recently laid herself open to 
the charge of forcing opium upon the Chinese at the point of her 
sword. For a power conducting such operations to proclaim that 
the United States could not absorb a small independent nation quite 
willing to join us would have been laughable, — if not, as Lc Consti- 
tiitioiincl termed it, mad. Yet it is perfectly clear that Great Britain 
was so anxious to prevent annexation that she stood ready, if sup- 
ported as her minister indicated, to undertake a war in order to 
establish at the Sabine a perpetual barrier against us. That such 
was the meaning of the Murphy Memorandum and also of the 
Diplomatic Act is already evident enough, and the close concert 
between the two powers makes the French government a full acces- 
sory in this design ; but, as if to place the matter beyond question, 
the British representative in Mexico was instructed in December, 
1844, to inform Santa Anna's cabinet that its course would "paralyse 
the exertions by which Great Britain and France were prepared to 
uphold the Independence of Texas against the encroachments of the 
United States, even at the risk of a collision with that Power. "-^ 

The Diplomatic Act, however, although the French ambassador 
had full authority to sign it and everything could have been com- 
pleted at one sitting, never was passed. When Anson Jones received 

-"Examiner, May 17. 1845. (Peel) London Times, May 5, 1845. Atlas, 
Sept. 2, 1844; Jan. 4, 1845. Mann to Calhoun, Oct. 31, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun 
Corr., 982. , 

-^ Atlas, April 6, 1844. Le Const., July 25, 1845. To Bank., No. 49, Dec. 
31, 1844. For meaning of the Act see note 17. 



395 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



written instructions to conclude it, he was already President-elect 
of the republic ; and instead of obeying he sent the representative of 
Texas in France and England leave of absence to return home. 
Smith, who was quite friendly to Jones, fully believed that he did 
this because he thought the project of annexation had been killed 
or indefinitely postponed, and wished to reserve for his own admin- 
istration the glory of making peace; and when Smith reached home 
Jones complacently said to him, " The negotiation shall take place 
here, and you' as Secretary of State shall conduct it for Texas." 
Before anything was accomplished, however, the time for this meas- 
ure had entirely passed. -- 

No better fared the rest of the programme. The same docu- 
ments were sent to Pakenham as to Bankhead, and that minister 
promptly conferred again with Pageot. Little discussion was nec- 
essary, and on the twenty-seventh of June Pakenham replied to 
Aberdeen substantially as follows : The rejection of the late treaty 
does not settle the question of annexation, and the Presidential elec- 
tion will turn upon it. Should Clay be successful, the project would 
not be abandoned ; but " there would at least be a prospect of its 
being discussed with the calmness and dignity required by its impor- 
tance, and by the interest which other Powers are justly entitled to 
take in it." For this reason England and France should avoid doing 
anything that would injure Clay's chances, and the plan in view 
" should not be known in this Country until after the Election." He 
urged further that any arrangement adopted for such a purpose 
should allow the United States to be really a party to it; and he 

^ Smith, Remin., 62-65. Jones's explanation was somewhat different (Memor., 
43, 57, 44, 55, 56). He said that, by an understanding with the President, he 
had been already vested with " the actual discharge of the Executive functions " 
(the accuracy of which assertion is directly disproved by the fact that Houston 
gave him this order) and that obedience would have meant war. But as he 
stated that annexation itself would have meant war, had France lived up to her 
agreements, and asserted that he was the architect of annexation, his action does 
not seem to have been due to fear of a conflict between England and the United 
States. In another passage of his Memoranda he intimated that obedience to 
the order might have defeated or delayed annexation and he would have suffered 
blame in consequence ; but in view of his course, as it will appear in the next 
chapter, to say nothing of other aspects of it, this explanation appears entirely 
unsatisfactory. In still another place in his book he says, " I felt at liberty to 
suspend the execution of the order." This corresponds quite well with Ashbel 
Smith's very credible explanation, and is doubtless the truth. Jones's inaction 
per se, however, would probably not have prevented England and France from 
pursuing their policy. He himself has said that all they wanted was a pretext 
for interference, and that they would not have cared whether the people of 
Texas approved of the Diplomatic Act or not:. and if England was ready to 
coerce Mexico, whose good-will it was highly important to retain, it does not 
seem likely that the Texas Secretary of State could have barred the way. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 396 

warned his government that if their plan were executed, " that is to 
say, if England and France should unite in determining to secure 
the independence of Texas without the consent and concurrence of 
this Country previously obtained," that determination would probably 
be met by the immediate annexation and occupation of Texas, 
" leaving it to the guaranteeing Powers to carry out the objects of 
the agreement as best they might " ; while should either England or 
France undertake to put the scheme through alone, " the announce- 
ment of such an intention would be met here by measures of the 
most extreme resistance." In the same sense wrote Pageot to the 
government of France.-'^ 

England for her part felt the strength of this plea for delay; 
and on the eighteenth of July Aberdeen informed Cowley that 
Pakenham's despatch furnished "much ground for serious reflec- 
tion," and that in view of it England was disposed "to defer, at all 
events until a more fitting season." the execution of the projected 
measure. This in all probability, however, did not mean that it 
had at once been decided, upon hearing from Washington, to aban- 
don a plan so carefully weighed and repeatedly announced. Xo sub- 
stantial evidence of such a decision has been found ; there was no 
occasion to determine at this time upon anything more than post- 
ponement; and it is practically impossible to believe that the British 
government, after deliberately adopting a policy that manifestly 
contemplated the chance of war and after officially stating that it 
mattered little what the United States might do so long as French 
support could be reckoned upon, would turn tail at the very first 
intimation of trouble with this country, and decide to leave the field 
before knowing what their ally would choose to do. Such ministers 
could neither demand respect nor respect themselves. " Reflection" 
was proper in such a case ; postponement until after the American 
election was evidently expedient ; and naturally England wished in 
particular to see how far she would be able to rely upon her asso- 
ciate after that power should have considered fully the advices from 
Washington.-^ 

Nor can any evidence be discovered that France resolved at once 
to retire. For her also there was really no occasion as yet to make 
such a decision. A pause was suggested by the circumstances and 

-^To Pak., No. 24. June 3, 1844. Pak., No. 76, June 27, 1844. 

-* To Cowley, No. 202, July 18, 1844. From Aberdeen's language it would 
seem likely that the idea of a longer postponement occurred to him but was laid 
aside ; but his phraseology may have been used merely to avoid all appearance of 
applying pressure to France. 



397 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

recommended by her ally. She therefore replied that she too thought 
it would be well to make no move until after the close of our Presi- 
dential campaign, and then her charge in Texas was directed to 
employ all suitable arguments against the sacrifice of nationality. 
It is likely enough, however, that Guizot now began to think more 
seriously than before of the policy proposed by England.^^ 

When the course of the French cabinet in this matter finally came 
into public view, the outcry against it was furious. In the Chamber 
of Deputies its action was denounced by the eloquent Berryer as an 
undignified intrigue. Bad faith towards the United States was 
charged. How can America trust us ? demanded Le Constitutionnel. 
It was entirely wrong, said many, to turn against an ancient comrade 
and valuable customer without the strongest of reasons. Not only 
w^as the American Union an ally and friend, but the mere existence 
of that republic, said Thiers, had prevented the nations of Europe 
from pointing to France as the only representative of the principles 
of the revolution ; and the development of the United States, causing 
England anxiety, had compelled her to treat France with more con- 
sideration than formerly. It was pronounced a fatal policy to 
alienate or weaken a people whose aid might any day be needed 
against Great Britain. " The United States are perhaps the only 
nation in the world besides France for which I desire greatness," 
exclaimed Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies with this last point 
in view.-" 

Above all, the government were attacked on the ground that 
Guizot, '■ the man of England," was not only sacrificing the true 
interests of his country but promoting those of her ancient enem3\ 
Texas must be either American or English, it was argued. The pre- 
ponderance that France has to fear is a preponderance on the ocean, 
not on the continent of America, said Billault in the Chamber. Bal- 
ance of power indeed! exclaimed La Revue Indcpendante ; England 
already has half the world, and must we help her to maintain that 
sort of equilibrium ? It is better for us, argued Thiers, that the 
small states belong to the American Union, for if they remain inde- 
pendent, fear of England will turn them against us. Our trade with 
Texas, it was suggested, never can be large so long as her growth is 
checked by Mexican raids; but that country, if incorporated in the 
United States, would develop as Louisiana has done, and France 

"Cowley. July 22, 1844. To Saligny, Aug. i, 1844: Le Const.. Jan. 12, 1846. 
^(Berryer, Thiers, Billault): Dcbats, Jan. 21-23, 3i> 1846. Le Const., Jan. 
31, 1S46. Jollivet. Nouveaux Docs. Amer., g. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 398 

would have her share of the business. " Touching self-abnegation ! " 
sneered the sarcastic ; we offend a traditional ally and labof for a 
traditional foe. Besides, answered the cautious, England is in such 
a situation at present that she could not fight ; and if we allow her 
to get us into trouble, we may get out of it as best we can.-' 

Guizot has well been described as largely a man of the closet. 
He was not very near to the people ; but he and his associates were 
far too shrewd not to foresee all these complaints and charges, when 
it was found that England and France could not carry the affair 
through high-handedly without serious opposition. Moreover these 
ideas, soon to be trumpeted in the newspapers and the tribune, were 
no doubt already circulating, in the summer of 1844, among the 
keen and well-informed public men of the country, and probably 
whisperings had begun to reach him. In fact some expressions of 
opinion had already been published. During May a writer in Le 
Constitutionnel declared, '' the Americans could not without madness 
allow Texas to become an independent and rival state." At about 
the same time Le National maintained that the struggle in that coun- 
try was one between Great Britain and the United States. England, 
though she endeavors to put " a moral sign on the shop door " by 
raising the slavery question, is trying to injure the United States and 
increase her own power in the Gulf of Mexico, said Le Correspon- 
dant. We are told that Guizot has protested again«:t the annexation 
of Texas, remarked Le Constitutionnel, and this does not surprise 
us: " It is much more in line with the policy of England than with 
that of France." It is unfortunate for us to be tied to the English 
cabinet, protested Le National about the middle of May. Even the 
Journal dcs Debats, commonly regarded as an administration paper, 
felt compelled to say about the first of June : " We believe that 
France has no occasion to occupy herself with the annexation of 
Texas to the North American confederation." According to Wilmer 
and Smith's European Times, the agitation over the affair had 
now created a marked sensation at Paris, and had revived the 
talk of making common cause with the United States against Eng- 
land in order to throw off the insulting yoke of British supremacy.-* 

Louis Philippe and Guizot must have begun to understand that 

^ Le Nat., May 27, 1844. Le Const., June 13, 1845. Debats, Jan. 21-23, 
1846. Revue Independante, Jan. 25, 1846. Lettre d'un Citoyen de New York, 
20-21. Le Const., June 13, 1845. Le Correspondant, Jan. i, 1846. 

^ King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. Le Const., May 26, 1844. Le Nat., May 20, 
16, 1844. Le Correspondant, June, 1844. Debats: N. Orl. Courier, June 28, 
1844. European Times. June 4, 1844. 



399 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



the consent of Parliament and the country to an Anglo-French war 
against the United States could not easily be obtained. " Every 
attempt to enlist France in a diplomatic — still more in an armed — 
resistance to the views of North America would meet death before 
the invincible repugnance of the country and the Chamber," de- 
clared La Revue dc Paris a few months later, and this was already 
becoming probable if not certain. Guizot will blunder if he dare to 
transform his diplomatic hostility against the United States into real 
hostility, for the country would not follow him, was a warning from 
La Re-vue Independante that could easily be foreseen. Public opin- 
ion renders Guizot's position weak on account of his English pro- 
clivities, reported the American minister at Paris in December, 1844; 
and to a large extent the head of the cabinet must have understood 
this much earlier. Besides, the feeling of the nation towards Mexico 
was by no means cordial. Neither the causes, the events nor the 
unsatisfactory ending of the recent war had yet been forgotten. A 
little later Thiers remarked that France owed less deference to that 
republic than to any other American state. In June, 1844, Le Steele 
of Paris said, " We wish Texas to be independent . . . as a counter- 
poise or curb for Mexico." " The annexation of Texas presents the 
double advantage of augmenting the power of the United States, our 
natural allies beyond the Atlantic," observed La Revue de Paris, 
" and of dealing a hard blow at that sad government of Mexico, 
against which we have so many grounds of complaint."^'' 

Meantime King, the American representative, had not been idle. 
Early in July he dined with Louis Philippe; and after dinner, bring- 
ing up the subject of Texas in a familiar conversation. His Majesty 
asked why the annexation treaty had been rejected. This afforded 
an opening, and the minister made all he could of it. He expressed 
his firm belief that a decided majority of the Americans favored the 
measure ; that although temporarily defeated on account of " polit- 
ical considerations of a domestic nature," it " would certainly be con- 
summated at no distant period " ; and that the interests of France, 
being purely commercial and quite distinct from those of England, 
would actually be promoted by such an arrangement ; upon which 
the King, while frankly admitting his desire to see the young republic 
remain independent, assured his guest that France " would not pro- 
ceed to the extent of acts hostile or unfriendly to the United States 
in reference to the Texas question." Probably, however, the assur- 

^ Reviic dc Paris, Feb. 15, 1845. Rcvuc Independante. Jan. 25, 1846. King, 
No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. (Thiers) Dcbats, Jan. 21, 1846. Le Sii'cle, June 14, 1844. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 40O 

ance thus reported by the American minister was couched in diplo- 
matic as well as gracious terms, and was expressed in a language 
which he cannot have used much, if at all, for nearly thirty years; 
and in view of the concert with England it must be supposed that he 
was unduly impressed by its apparent cordiality. In real truth it 
can have indicated nothing more than a politic desire to avoid as far 
as possible offending the United States. The minister's representa- 
tions, on the other hand, seem to have been full and explicit. They 
were probably the earliest information the French government 
obtained with reference to the depth of feeling on the subject that 
prevailed in some parts, at least, of this country ; and when rein- 
forced soon after by Pageot's and Pakenham's expostulations, they 
must have appeared well worthy of attention.^** 

King then proceeded to discuss the matter with Guizot, telling him 
that intimations of a contemplated joint protest against the annexa- 
tion of Texas had been received from a source that could not wholly 
be disregarded. Guizot replied " with considerable animation if not 
some impatience " that no such step had been taken ; that France had 
acted in this matter for herself; that her interests, being purely com- 
mercial, differed from those of England ; and that the rejection of 
the treaty had now banished the subject. King replied that he was 
gratified by Guizot's assurances ; that a movement such as that erro- 
neously imputed to France would have impaired seriously the 
friendly, indeed almost affectionate, feelings entertained for her by 
the American people ; that the United States would view with great 
distrust any proceeding calculated to place their weak neighbor under 
foreign and particularly under British influence ; that Texas must be 
absorbed in order to guard against the danger of England's controlling 
her; that a conviction of this necessity, though more general in the 
Democratic party, pervaded a large majority of the American peo- 
ple; and that consequently the project of annexation was by no 
means dead. Just how much eff'ect these representations had, it is 
of course impossible to say ; but Ashbel Smith, who was well quali- 
fied and well situated to form an opinion, believed that King satisfied 
Guizot as to the umbrage that his proposed course would give in the 
United States.^^ 

Calhoun also endeavored to influence the French government. 

^'' King, No. I, July 13, 1844. In early life King was secretary of legation 
at St. Petersburg. 

^^ King, No. 2, July 31, 1844. The interview took place on July 20. Smith 
to Jones, Dec. 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 411. 



401 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

About the first of September King received a despatch in which, 
after straining Louis PhiHppe's cordial assurances to the greatest 
possible extent and there nailing them with pointed marks of appre- 
ciation, the Secretary went on, in what the London Times called a 
magazine article, to argue substantially as follows : It is not for the real 
interests of France, England or even Mexico to oppose annexation 
if peace, the extension of commerce, and security " are objects of 
primary policy with them." The United States and Texas are 
destined at some day to become one nation, and it is for the general 
good that this union take place by common consent. Opposition 
would " not improbably " lead to a war between the United States 
and Mexico ; or, should another power temporarily prevent annexa- 
tion and an outbreak of hostilities, our people would feel deep resent- 
ment, and " be ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to 
effect " the design " by force." Meanwhile the general peace would 
be insecure, and Texas, uncertain what to do or expect, would lan- 
guish. France as well as Fngland desires that country to be inde- 
pendent for commercial reasons ; but England hopes also that slavery 
may be abolished there and, as a consequence, in the United States, 
and to this scheme the interests of the continental European powers 
are opposed. The experiment of emancipation has proved enor- 
mously costly and disastrous to Great Britain, while the nations that 
have avoided her example have increased in wealth and power. 
Therefore she wishes to recover her lost position by destroying or 
crippling the productivity of her rivals, and now seeks to reach her 
end by uprooting slavery in America. This would give her a mo- 
nopoly of tropical commodities, for not only would the output of the 
United States, Cuba and Brazil decrease like that of Jamaica, but 
there would be a race war as in San Domingo, — a war that would 
involve the Indian as well as the negro, " and make the whole one 
scene of blood and devastation." Is it not better for the continent 
of Europe, then, to obtain tropical productions at a low price from 
the American nations, than to be dependent for them upon " one 
great monopolizing Power " and pay a high price ? And is it not 
for their interest to develop new regions that will become profitable 
markets for their goods, rather than to buy from old and distant 
countries, whose population has reached its limit? Here again it is 
impossible to calculate how much effect was produced. But there 
must have been some, for the ideas were forcible; and even if the 
administration rejected their logic, it could easily be seen that their 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 402 

influence on public sentiment, should they be urged by the opposition, 
was likely to be considerable.^^ 

Louis Philippe's general preference was to avoid war. He was 
a "prudent" monarch, as our minister observed, " and ever solicitous 
to maintain peace and good will, both for his own sake, and that of 
France." His avowed policy was described by King as " peace, and 
non-intervention as the best means of securing peace." Early in 
November he dwelt upon these, his favorite themes, in an interview 
with the American minister, expressing opinions and sentiments, 
" which though not uttered with reference to the United States, 
Mexico and Texas, were strikingly applicable to the existing rela- 
tions of the three republics." Recent difficulties between the govern- 
ment of Mexico and the French representative in that country prob- 
ably had some effect in the same direction, and both domestic uncer- 
tainties and the embarrassments growing out of the Algiers and 
Morocco questions assisted. There were thus a number of deter- 
rent influences at work upon the French cabinet ; and accordingly it 
showed signs of backwardness during the autumn in the matter of 
co-operating decisively with England.^^ 

The British administration could not fail to be influenced by this 
lukewarm disposition, since its policy leaned avowedly on the atti- 
tude of France. The New York correspondent of the London Times 
reported that the Locofocos actually desired a war with England, 
which naturally added to the gravity of the situation ; and then Santa 
Anna adopted a course that had no little effect. In order to score 
a point against the Mexican Congress he talked openly about 
Murphy's conversation with Lord Aberdeen, and instead of favor- 
ing the recognition of Texas he represented His Lordship's remarks 
as evidence that England would assist him to reconquer that country. 
Bankhead regarded this conduct as showing a "total want of good 
faith," and protested against the President's announced purpose of 
laying Murphy's Memorandum before the Congress ; and his course 
in so doing was approved by his government. On the twenty-third 
of October, therefore, Aberdeen instructed him to inform Mexico 
that since she would not consent to recognize Texas, the proposed 
concert between England and France " as set forth in the Memo- 
randum " fell to the ground. Great Britain still urged that the 

^ Times: Revue de Paris, Jan. 9, 1845. To King, No. 14. Aug. 12, 1844: 
Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 39. 

^ King, No. I, July 13; No. 4, Oct. 6; No. 6, Nov. 15, 1844. (Backward- 
ness) Smith to Jones, Dec. 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 411. 



403 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



annexation of Texas to the United States would be " an evil of the 
greatest magnitude " to the mother-country, and that it could only be 
avoided by immediately recognizing the young republic ; but the 
despatch was a formal notice that England no longer held herself 
under any obligation to Mexico to help avert the evil at the risk of 
a collision with the United States. This did not signify by any 
means, however, that her own interests or her engagements elsewhere 
might not cause her to pursue much the same course as that outlined 
in the Memorandum, and there is no evidence that she had yet aban- 
doned this policy ; but the exasperating conduct of Mexico, the failure 
of Texas thus far to accept the proposed Diplomatic Act, and still 
more the lukewarmness exhibited on the other side of the Channel 
doubtless undermined her resolution, and caused her to show, as 
Ashbel Smith reported, a certain backwardness herself."* 

^* Smith to Jones, Dec. 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 411. London Times, Oct. 
17, 1844. Bank., No. 66, Aug. 29, 1844. To Bank., No. 34, Oct. 23. 1844. The 
despatch of Oct. 23 has been cited as " definite proof of English withdrawal from 
the project of joint action before the English government had any direct refusal 
from France to go on with that action " ; but the two powers did in fact main- 
tain their joint action in this matter so long as any hope of preventing annexa- 
tion remained (see Chapter xxi.). Probably, however, what the author of this 
passage had in mind was the project of acting jointly in the particular manner 
contemplated in June, 1844; but even this view does not seem correct, i. Eng- 
land could not fairly and honorably withdraw from a plan of joint action with 
France by sending a note to Mexico, and at this time she was peculiarly anxious 
to have the confidence and good-will of France. 2. Had England decided upon a 
new policy, notice of it would almost certainly have been given to Pakenham and 
Elliot as in other instances. 3. The proposition of the Diplomatic Act. which 
involved joint action with France on a basis really as positive as did the Murphy 
Memorandum, was not now cancelled by England as according to this theory it 
should have been. 4. In his No. i, May 17, 1845, Smith reported to his govern- 
ment from London that Aberdeen had informed Terrell (who had arrived in that 
city on Jan. 12, 1845, and was still there) that the British government were even 
then " willing on their part to enter into a Diplomatic Act embracing the stipu- 
lations and guarantees as set forth in the accounts of my interviews with Ld 
Aberdeen last year, particularly that of the 24th June (I believe), but that the 
French Government were unwilling to enter into such obligations or to employ 
any other than moral means towards Mexico" (Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 1196). This 
appears virtually to prove that the despatch of Oct. 23, 1844, did not indicate 
an intention or even a desire to withdraw from the action in concert with 
France that had been proposed in June. 5. After France declined to incur the 
risk of war with United States, the British government took four weeks to formu- 
late a new and pacific programme, whereas on the theory discussed they would 
have been ready and eager to announce such a policy at once. 6. The despatch of 
Oct. 23 can be explained satisfactorily without encountering these difficulties : 
(a) England had a plan (Murphy Memorandum) for joint action with France 
in co-operation with Mexico, and also a plan (Diplomatic Act) for joint action 
with France and (if necessary) the coercion of Mexico. The former was the only 
one of which Mexico knew, and therefore the despatch of Oct. 23, intended for 
Mexico, should be understood as referring to it. Indeed that despatch said that 
" the proposition set forth in the Memorandum . . . was based entirely on the 
assumed recognition by Mexico of the independence of Texas," and also that 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 



404 



November 25 the result of the American election was announced 
by the London newspapers, and the time for England and France to 
prosecute or to abandon their plan had arrived. About a week later, 
at an interview with Aberdeen, Smith found the minister counting 
on Guizot for no decisive action against the United States and, as 
was inevitable in that situation, unwilling to give a just ground of 
offence to this country. That very day His Lordship's misgivings 
w^ere fully justified. In a talk with Cowley the minister of Louis 
Philippe remarked, as Calhoun and King had urged, that the annexa- 
tion affair concerned Great Britain more than it did France. 

" As both Governments have recognised Texas," answered the 
British ambassador, "you would no doubt join with England in 
negotiations to secure recognition from Mexico." 

" Undoubtedly " answered Guizot, " we will use our best efforts 
for that purpose, and will even refuse to recognise the annexation 
of Texas to the United States; but, as a Question of Peace or War, 
I am not prepared to say that its junction with the American States 
is of sufficient importance to us to justify us in having recourse to 
arms in order to prevent it." This was obviously a diplomatic but 
distinct negative."^ 

The British government then pondered anew on the subject, and 
at length after four weeks of deliberation they informed Elliot what 
was now their policy. " It is," wrote Aberdeen, " to urge Mexico by 
every available argument, and in every practicable manner, to recog- , / 
nise without delay the Independence of Texas, as the only rational 
course to be taken for securing the real Interests of Mexico, to which 
Country the annexation of Texas to the United States would be 
ruinous." At the same time a strong desire was manifested by His 
Lordship to avoid exciting public sentiment in this country. A pas- 
sive course, " or rather a course of observation," was therefore dic- 
tated as under the existing circumstances the most prudent policy ; 

it was the proposed concert between Great Britain and France " as set forth in 
the Memorandum " which fell to the ground. Evidently an announcement of 
the failure of the first plan did not abolish the second, and it should be re- 
called that the Memorandum itself, instead of saying that in case Mexico would 
not consent to recognize Texas the plans of England to oppose annexation would 
not be carried out, only said " might not." (b) Aberdeen may very reasonably 
have believed that such an announcement as that of Oct. 23 was the best way to 
bring Santa Anna to the point of recognizing Texas, and it may have been made 
for that purpose, (c) It seemed quite clear that Santa Anna was trying to play 
fast and loose with England, and the despatch of Oct. 23 was a proper move to 
stop his game, (d) Under the wording of the Memorandum, self-respect de- 
manded of England such a move. See also Terrell: Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 11 72. 
^= Smith, Dec. 24: note 34. Cowley, No. 56S, Dec. 2, 1844. 



405 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

and Elliot was directly forbidden to involve his government in any 
active campaign. ^"^ 

Near the close of the year 1844, among the papers accompanying 
Tyler's annual Message, was published Calhoun's despatch to King 
which has already been cited, and in due course the document ap- 
peared in Europe. There it made a sensation, — " quite a sensation," 
reported the minister, — for Calhoun said that our Executive particu- 
larly appreciated " the declaration of the King, that, in no event 
would any steps be taken by his Government in the slightest degree 
hostile, or which would give to the United States just cause of com- 
plaint." This, as we have learned, was a liberal exaggeration of 
Louis Philippe's friendliness, yet — as Calhoun doubtless foresaw — 
the language imputed to him could not be disavowed. Not only was 
public sentiment in France very warm towards the United States 
and far from cordial towards Great Britain, but the election of 
officers in the Chamber of Deputies had lately revealed a serious 
break in the administration's forces; its majorities there were small 
and fluctuating; its fate was uncertain ; and nearly all of the charges 
brought against it amounted to the one heinous offence of subser- 
viency to England.^' 

The London Times, though it demanded with the utmost emphasis 
to be informed " categorically " whether France had been giving such 
assurances to the United States while " aft'ecting " to join with Eng- 
land, was therefore unable to extort a reply. Terrell, now the repre- 
sentative of Texas, concluded that France was entirely indifferent 
to the fate of his country; and although the French ambassador soon 
made known to Aberdeen a despatch from Guizot which described 
Calhoun's remarks as misleading and expressed a willingness to 
unite with England, as had been proposed, in securing the recogni- 
tion of Texas and guaranteeing her against molestation on the side 
of Mexico, it was not easy to feel perfectly satisfied as to the atti- 
tude of His Majesty's government. In short, while Calhoun's clever 
— even sharp — course did not destroy the concert of the powers, 
it evidently had some effect in rendering that concert less harmonious 
and less reliable. At the same time the publication of the despatch 
revealed very clearly to Aberdeen, as he admitted, the jealousy of 
the American annexationists against all foreign interference, and the 

^To Elliot, No. 13, Dec. 31, 1844. To Bank., No. 49, Dec. 31, 1844. 
Pakenham and Bankhead also were instructed. Naturally Aberdeen tried to make 
it appear that no change in British policy had occurred. 

*' To King, No. 14, Aug. 12, 1844: Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 39. King, 
No. 10, Jan. 29, 1845. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FR/\NCE 406 

danger that any occurrence justifying that state of mind would pre- 
cipitate the United States into " active measures." In particular, 
he concluded, a war with Mexico almost necessarily involving the 
destruction of Texan independence might very easily be kindled ; 
and the importance of extreme caution was brought forcibly home 
to his mind.^^ 

Up to this time, owing to the peculiar situation already explained, 
neither an acceptance nor a rejection of the Diplomatic Act had been 
received from Texas ; and that idea, to be embodied in some plan 
consistent with the now pacific attitude of the two powers, had con- 
tinued to be entertained by them. Quite soon, however, after assur- 
ing England that she was still ready for joint action, France found 
an opportunity to eliminate that project also. This was in conse- 
quence of something which occurred in Mexico. All through the 
summer and early autumn Santa Anna had continued to talk of war 
against the Texans ; but, soon after November came in, a revolution 
in the great State of Jalisco produced a change in his language. 
General Wavell, an Englishman in the Mexican service, had believed 
all along that he desired to get rid of the Texas difficulty ; for some 
time fear of the designs of the United States had made him uneasy ; 
and now, in the revolutionary conflict forced upon him, he was nat- 
urally anxious to have the political support of Great Britain and the 
financial assistance of the British capitalists doing business in the 
country. Accordingly his minister, Rejon, stated that Mexico would 
listen to any propositions coming from England and France with 
reference to the recognition of Texas ; and finally at the end of 
November Santa Anna definitely proposed to acknowledge the inde- 
pendence of that nation on the basis of an indemnity, a boundary at 
the Colorado, and a guaranty of the northern frontier of Mexico 
from England and France. Apparently a step had now been taken 
toward a solution of the problem, and France made haste to pro- 
nounce the Diplomatic Act no longer necessary. ^^ 

^ Times, Jan. 2, 10, 1845. Terrell, Nos. i, 2, Jan. 21, 27, 1845. To Elliot, No, 
I, Jan. 23, 1845. Apparently Aberdeen took some step to soothe the United 
States, for about a month later Everett reported (private, Feb. 26, 1845) that, 
although the subject was not one on which it " could be expected " that he 
" should receive any official information," he had " good grounds for saying, 
that the annexation of Texas would not cause a breach of the existing relations 
between the United States and Great Britain." From the effect of Calhoun's 
despatch upon Aberdeen one can reasonably infer that it had had considerable 
influence at Paris. 

^^ After Jones became President, he expressed to the British government 
through Elliot a desire to have the proposition of the Diplomatic Act put in 
his hands, " duly prepared for execution," to be submitted to the people at a 



407 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

January 23, 1845, then, Aberdeen prepared new instructions for 
Elliot. On the one hand he pointed out the gravely delicate state of 
American public sentiment, and on the other he exhibited the propo- 
sition of Santa Anna. No doubt the Mexican terms are unaccept- 
able in their present form, he admitted ; but as a " first step " they 
are " of great importance and value," and of course Texas will avail 
herself of the good offices of Englanfl and France " with a view to 
the modification " of them. Despite Calhoun the concert of the two 
powers continues, in proof of which I hand you a copy of the new 
instructions, very similar to yours, forwarded to Saligny ; and " under 
certain circumstances those Powers would not refuse to take part 
in an arrangement by which Texas and Mexico should be bound 
each to respect the Territory of the other"; though, after all, this is 
mainly an affair which concerns these two particular nations. To 
such modest terms was the opposition of England at length reduced. 
The eft'ect of the concert had become a mere contingency, and in 
reference to the United States defensive instead of aggressive 
strategy was now in order, with care even " to avoid all unnecessary 
mention'' of our government. The keenest anxiety to prevent the 
annexation of Texas, however, was still exhibited.**^ 

In the afternoon of March 16 the steamer Neiv York left New 
Orleans for Texas, carrying word that the American Congress had 
voted for annexation, and on the twentieth Galveston had the news. 
Four days later a British vessel of war brought Elliot the instruc- 
tions that have just been described. He read them with the deepest 
interest and of course with the most earnest desire to carry out the 
wishes of his government. There was, however, a serious difficulty, 
for it seemed to him impossible even to mention what Santa Anna 
had proposed and Aberdeen recommended as a basis of negotiation. 
'* Nothing," he replied to the Foreign Office," that is so much mixed 
with securities and guarantees upon the part of the European Powers, 
Great Britain in particular, can be offered to this people with the 
least hope of success, and the knowledge of these proposals of 
Mexico at the present moment would be decisive against the possi- 
bility of maintaining the Independence of the Country. They would 
light up a flame from one end of the North American Confederacy 

propitious moment (Elliot, No. 17, Dec. 21, 1844) ; but before this request reached 
London France had retired from that proposition. Bank., No. 65, Aug. 29; No. 
94, Nov. 12, 1844. Wavell, Memoir on Texas, Nov., 1844: F. O., Texas, xi. (Un- 
easy) Bank., No. 52, July 31, 1844. Id., No, 93, Oct. 30; No. 102, Nov. 29, 1844. 
Terrell. No. 2, Jan. 27, 1845. 

■"'To Elliot, No. I, Jan. 23, 1845. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 408 

to the other." None the less, if Mexico would but acknowledge 
Texas on the sole condition of maintaining her nationality, Elliot 
still saw " little reason to doubt that this question might be speedily 
and securely adjusted."*^ 

Saligny, as we have observed, spent most of his time at New 
Orleans, but he probably had received there somewhat earlier an 
urgent despatch from Guizot. While directing that as little as pos- 
sible be said about the United States, the French government now 
ordered the charge to exert himself with both the administration and 
the people of Texas against the project of annexation, as a measure 
unworthy of an independent nation. The representations of Calhoun 
regarding the attitude of France made it particularly necessary, he 
was instructed, to pursue an active policy, and the inclination of 
Santa Anna to consider the question of recognizing Texas was 
described as " a decisive reason " why that country should cling to 
her sovereignty. In concert with Elliot, Saligny was therefore 
directed to recommend this view, and to urge that " every thought 
of annexation " be renounced. ^- 

On receiving these orders the charge naturally sought his post, 
and he was now at Galveston. Elliot, whose policy it was to counter- 
act the suspicion of British designs by associating closely with his 
French colleague in this business, soon took him into his counsels; 
and the next morning they set out for the Texan seat of government, 
where they were extremely anxious to arrive in advance of authori- 
tative news from the United States. Donelson was liable to appear 
at any hour, and a copy of the official report of the passage of the 
annexation resolution was said to be on the way via Red River ; but 

^^ Arrangoiz, No. 52 (res.), March 17, 1845. Elliot. No. 14, March 22, 1845. 
The steamer should have reached Galveston on the i8th. and the Picayune of 
March 29 represented that she did ; but Elliot and the Houston Star of March 2;^ 
give the date as March 20. As the Star says she brought New Orleans information 
of the 18th, she would seem to have been delayed near the city. Yell to Polk, 
March 26, 1845: Polk Pap. Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Jones (Memor., 66) 
said that the ministers of England and France, in feeling that the people (if 
Texas were recognized by Mexico) would decide for independence, were deceived 
by " their own over-sanguine hopes." Two points ought, however, to be noted. 
Jones and Allen, the highest officials of the nation, assured them and appeared 
to be convinced that such would be the case {e. g., Elliot, No. 17, Dec. 21, 1844; 
Dec. 28, 1844, secret) ; and it was not very unreasonable to believe that — assisted 
by recognition, by an opportunity to obtain favorable commercial arrangements 
with England, by the efforts to bring the people over to the side of nationality 
which the government were ready to make (Elliot, No. 17, Dec. 21, 1844), and 
by the unsatisfactory terms offered by the United States — the strong though 
cautious minority might convert enough lukewarm annexationists to liecome the 
dominant party. 

••-(At New Orleans) Journ. Com.: Newark Adv., April 30, 1S45. To Saligny, 
Tan. 17, 1845: F. O., Texas, xxi. 



409 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



the two envoys reached the capital first. They agreed that if Brown's 
plan had been adopted by the American Executive, the chief imme- 
diate danger lay in efforts to have Jones convene the Congress, espe- 
cially since Elliot regarded the existing body as the least reliable he 
had yet seen in the country and already " deeply committed " for 
annexation ; while they felt that if Benton's method had been chosen, 
the commission it contemplated, sitting in Texas with $100,000 at its 
command, '* would at once overwhelm the whole power and influence 
of the Constituted Authorities of the land." They decided, therefore, 
that " every effort consistent with the spirit " of their instructions 
ought to be exerted to prevent the government of Texas from assem- 
bling the Congress or entering upon any negotiations with a view 
to annexation, until England and France could have time to obtain 
recognition from Mexico or, failing in that aim, " provide for the 
emergency in an equally eft"ectual manner " in Europe.*^ 

Jones was away from home in the evening of the envoys' arrival, 
but they had a " full and frank " conversation with Ashbel Smith, 
now the Secretary of State, and the next morning, after reading 
their instructions to him and the President, they urged " every argu- 
ment that presented itself " to them, " whether founded upon the 
honour and advantage of the Country, or upon the ruinous conse- 
quences of annexation, and the ambiguity and doubtful nature of the 
[American] resolutions." Elliot was regarded by Donelson, a per- 
son well able to gauge politicians and diplomats, as " a shrewd and 
cunning man," while Saligny was described as Napoleonic in appear- 
ance and " astute " in intellect ; and it is evident from Elliot's report 
of the proceedings that both men were now very much in earnest. 
On the other side, Jones was in favor of independence and probably 
felt convinced, as he afterwards wrote in his book, that it would 
benefit the Texans to maintain a separate political existence. In 
February he had received word by a man just from Mexico that 
Herrera, the new President, was very favorably disposed toward 
peace. Furthermore, by taking the ground that the administration 
desired to continue the national career and that the people would do 
the same should the independence of the country be promptly 
acknowledged by Mexico, he had committed himself in a manner 
that Elliot and Saligny were fully able to take advantage of. As for 
Smith, he not only preferred independence but was regarded by the 
American charge as a greater enemy to annexation than even the 

"Elliot, No. 10. March 6; secret, April 2, 1845. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 4IO 

outspoken Terrell. He was a man of no little ability, as we have 
noted ; and according to the Mexican consul at New Orleans he had 
a dominating influence over the Executive. The consul believed also 
that his ambition equalled his talents, and that he not only wished 
to be President, but felt that in the case of annexation his role would 
be comparatively undistinguished. Under such circumstances, even 
had Jones desired to stand up for that measure, it would have been 
extremely difiicult to do so. He made no sign of such a preference, 
however. When the envoys argued for nationality he and Smith 
replied, " that so far as they were personally concerned it was 
unnecessary to insist upon these views," and the President declared 
that he was " sincerely desirous of maintaining the independence of 
the Country." At the same time he stimulated the envoys by 
remarking that he saw in himself only the agent of the people, and 
thought that unless Texas could speedily know she would be recog- 
nized on the condition of remaining a nation, " He should feel that it 
was in vain to resist the tide." As for a course of action he agreed 
perfectly with his visitors, desiring neither to assemble the Congress 
nor to have a United States commission sit in the country.'** 

Elliot and Saligny now formally invited the government to accept 
the good offices of England and France with a view to an early and 
honorable settlement with Mexico upon the basis of independence. 
Jones thereupon instructed the Secretary of State with correspond- 
ing formality to accept this intervention, and the following " Condi- 
tions preliminary to a treaty of peace " between the two countries 
were then drawn up: " i, Mexico consents to acknowledge the inde- 
pendence of Texas ; 2, Texas engages that she will stipulate in the 
treaty not to annex herself or become subject to any country what- 
ever; 3, Limits and other conditions to be matters of arrangement in 
the final treaty ; 4. Texas to be willing to remit disputed points 
respecting territory and other matters to the arbitration of umpires." 
It was then proposed, evidently by the charges, that the following 
agreement be made; i. The signature and seal of a duly authorized 
Mexican minister are to be attached to the preliminary conditions of 

" Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Don. to Calhoun, Jan. 30, 1845 : Jameson, 
Calhoun Corr., 1023. (Saligny) Smith, Remin., 22; Foote, Remin., 50. Smith, 
Remin., 81, 82. Jones. Memor., 66. Jones, Letter: Niles.. Jan. 15, 1848, p. 308. 
Jones's best defence of his course js to be found in this letter ; but it is too 
ingenious to be convincing, and there are too many facts against it. Don., No. 
21, April 29, 1845. Arrangoiz, No. 55 (res.), March 24, 1845. Early in March 
Smith had proposed to Elliot that England guarantee to Mexico the abandon- 
ment by Texas of all annexation projects, which implied that he believed Texas 
ivoiild bind herself to that polipy (Elliot, No. 10, March 6, 1845). 



411 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

peace, and the government of Texas pledge themselves to issue 
forthwith, after this acceptance of them shall have been placed in 
the hands of the President, a proclamation announcing the conclu- 
sion of the preliminaries of peace with the republic of ^Mexico. 2, 
For a period of ninety days from the date of this Memorandum 
Texas " agrees not to accept any proposals, nor to enter into any 
negotiations to annex Herself to any other Country."*^ 

At this, however, the President hesitated, for he perceived what 
Elliot described as " the serious responsibility " that he was desired 
to incur. During the twenty-eighth he consulted the cabinet twice, 
and once had the charges present their views before it; but he was 
only a second-rate man with everything against him, and it was in 
vain to struggle. From conviction or policy he had represented that 
the people would choose independence if recognition could soon be 
obtained from the mother-country ; and he could not logically, as 
their avowed agent, refuse to adopt the one possible course which 
might place this boon within their reach. At the pressing request of 
Jones and Saligny, Elliot very reluctantly consented to make a secret 
journey to Mexico with the utmost despatch, and explain to the 
British and French ministers there " the extreme difficulty of the 
President's situation, and the urgency of immediate promptitude, 
and exact conformity to the preliminary arrangement" submitted; 
and finally, on his promising this and on the personal assurance of 
the charges that the Memorandum of the Conference would be made 
known only to the British and French representatives in Mexico and 
the United States and to their home governments, Jones accepted 
the plan on March 29.**' 

Three alternatives were kept in view, it would appear, in these 
negotiations. The first was to satisfy the peoj^le of Texas, by 
obtaining the assent of Mexico to the preliminary conditions, that 
peace with independence could be had. The second was to have the 
affair settled by the European governments with a representative of 
Texas beyond the Atlantic ; and the third was to obtain such a formal 
declaration on the part of England and France to sustain Texan 
independence " and prevent further disturbance and complication 
from Mexico," as would " enable the friends of independence to 

*° Memo, of Conference ; Conditions : F. O.. Texas, xiii. 

^"Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 386. Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. It was dis- 
tinctly understood at the conference that, should the Texans decide in favor of 
annexation, their government would be at liberty to execute their will (Jones, 
Memor., 475). Elliot was informed by Smith that none of the cabinet felt "any 
good will to the [American] resolutions." 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 412 

defeat their opponents at the next election." What provision was 
made for the first and most desired of these ahernatives has now 
been explained. The second and third of them required the presence 
in Europe of a Texan envoy fully competent and fully authorized for 
the business. Accordingly Elliot and Saligny urged that Aslibel 
Smith go there immediately with " full powers to conclude any 
arrangement which might seem to the Governments and himself to 
be necessary for the safety of the Country," and Jones cordially con- 
sented. Allen was therefore made Secretary of State, and Smith 
prepared to set off at once for his former post.*^ 

Elliot intended to give out that he would sail in the Elcctra to 
meet his wife at Charleston, South Carolina, but really be landed at 
Vera Cruz and have the Electra reported there by another name ; 
and in returning he proposed to disembark at a point in the United 
States where he would not be recognized, and gain New Orleans " in 
some unobserved manner." On reaching Galveston, however, he 
found that a British war vessel, the Enrydice, commanded by his 

■"Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Smith's appointment was asked "as a striking 
proof of the good- dispositions " of the Texan government. All these facts, de- 
rived from Elliot's report, are a sufficiently clear indication of the character of 
Smith's mission ; but that gentleman himself had something to say at the time 
about it. According to the editor of the principal newspaper of Houston, a 
place through which he doubtless passed on his way to Galveston, he was going 
to England "with the avowed object of conducting negotiations for the acknowl- 
edgment of our independence through British intervention." All the way on his 
journey from Washington to the coast, after the interviews with Elliot and 
Saligny, he loudly denounced the annexation resolution of the American Congress 
at the taverns on the road, it was said, and several of the most respectable men 
of the county were ready to declare, the editor stated, that his conversation re- 
vealed an uncompromising opposition to that resolution (Houston Telegraph, 
April 23, 1845), After he reached the port. Smith wrote to Jones representing 
the sentiment among the people as intensely strong in favor of annexation, and 
added that he did not suppose his going abroad would be desired '' if likely to 
produce no beneficial results," which implies clearly that he had been sent to 
accomplish something against that project (Jones, Memor., 446). Later, attempts 
were very naturally made to explain all this away. In an open letter dated 
August 7, 1845, Smith pronounced it " utterly false " that he went to Europe to 
concert measures with foreign governments to prevent annexation (F. O. Texas, 
xiv.) ; but this letter was intended to make the piiblic believe he was not opposed 
to that measure, which was certainly not correct. In other words the letter can- 
not be regarded as wholly ingenuous. In his Reminiscences he says that Jones 
sent him to Europe to close the Texas legations there in a becoming manner ; but in 
that case why did the state of public opinion in Texas make him doubtful whether 
his mission could prove beneficial ? Jones, commenting in h'is book on Smith's 
letter from Galveston, explained that Smith did not understand his errand : but 
this is absurd. Smith seems to have had the clearest head in Texas : he was 
accustomed to deal with the foremost statesmen of Europe and had won their 
respect; Aberdeen described him as "a man of excellent capacity"; as Secretary 
of State he was in conference with Elliot and Saligny on three successive days ; 
and he had opportunities to confer with Saligny at will, it is probable, all the 
way to Galveston, since the two men sailed together for New Orleans (Memphis 
Eagle, April 23, 1845). Jones's explanation is manifestly a pretence. 



413 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

cousin, George Elliot, had arrived at that port. Writing to Jones 
that a despatch from Bankhead represented the Alexican govern- 
ment as still ready to negotiate, he went aboard the Electro, was 
transferred to the Enrydice out of sight of land, and then sailed 
away for \'era Cruz. Saligny, meanwhile, after writing from Gal- 
veston to the President, " Be cheerful and firm at Washington, and 
my word for it, everything will soon come out right," sped away for 
New York City in such haste that when the steamer stopped for 
wood a few miles below Xew Orleans, he sprang ashore, it was 
reported, obtained a horse, and rode on. It was surmised that his 
purpose was to communicate with Paris in the quickest possible 
manner, and this appears to be the rational explanation of his course. 
Ashbel Smith — reluctantly in view of the exhibitions of Texan 
public opinion observed on his way to the coast — proceeded on his 
mission ; and Jones and Allen remained at the capital to hold the 
gate.** 

In short, then, it appears that Great Britain was so anxious to 
prevent the annexation of Texas that she stood ready, if supported 
by France, to coerce Mexico and fight the United States ; that the 
French government were at first no less willing than England to 
agree upon decisive measures ; that the determination of the Ameri- 
can people to resent vigorously such dictation — a course sure to 
arouse the many Frenchmen who were against the British, against 
the King or against Guizot — caused that power to fall back ; that in 
consequence England wavered and then withdrew ; and that all this 
grand effort at international concert resulted only in a sort of con- 
spiracy to divert the people of Texas from the destiny actually 
preferred by the majority. And it is interesting to note, first, that 
probably the decisive element in the affair was the readiness of a 
large number of Americans to plunge into a war for which the 
nation was wholly unprepared ; and. secondly, that after these 
diplomatic events had been taking place for months, it was loudly 
asserted by opponents of Tyler's administration, not only that Eng- 
land had no schemes afoot with reference to Texas, but that every 
idea of a European concert against annexation was transparent 
moonshine.*® 

"Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Id. to Jones, April 3, 5. 1845: Jones, Memor., 
441, 443. Saligny to Jones, April 3. 1845: ib., 443. (Saligny) N. Orl. Picayune: 
Memphis Eagle, April 23, 1845: Wash. Constitution : Charleston Courier. April 
29, 1845. Smith to Jones. April 9, 1845: Jones. Memor., 446. 

^"£. g., Nat. Intell., Feb. 20, 1845. No doubt many who talked of war be- 
lieved England would not fight, but even these would not have shrunk from it. 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 

I. Manuscripts. 

Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris.^ 

Archivo de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico : De- 
spatches to and from Ministers and Consuls in the United States, 
Great Britain and France. 

Bancroft Collection. New York (Lenox) Public Library. 

Bancroft Papers, Mass. Historical Society. 

Campbell Papers, Library of Congress. 

Clayton Papers, Library of Congress. 

Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress. 

Ford Collection, New York (Lenox) Public Library. 

Jackson Papers, Library of Congress. 

Jackson Papers (Knoxville Collection), Library of Congress (par- 
tially available). 

Jackson Papers, New York (Lenox) Public Library. 

Lamar Papers, Texas State Library, Austin. 

Mangum Papers belonging to A. W. Graham, Esq. 

Markoe and ^Nlaxcy Papers, Library of Congress. 

Miller Papers, Texas State Library. 

Pierce Papers, Library of Congress. 

Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 

Polk Papers, Chicago Historical Society.- 

Public Record Ofifice, London : Foreign Office Papers ; Slave Trade 
Papers ; Admiralty Records. 

Texas (National) Archives, Austin: Diplomatic Correspondence; 
Senate Journal (secret) ; Laws of Eighth Congress. 

LTnited States Department of State: Archives of the Texas Lega- 
tion; Circulars issued to Diplomatic and Consular Agents; Con- 
fidential Report Books ; Domestic Letter Books ; Instructions to 

'■ The documents bearing directly on the annexation of Texas were not, how- 
ever, seen in the French archives. This matter is explained in the General 
Note. p. I. Information from Mexico as late as 1833 was obtained. 

" These have recently been transferred to the Library of Congress, but the 
author distinguishes between the two collections as a slight acknowledgment of 
the courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society. 

471 



472 ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 

and Despatches from Ministers, Consuls, Special Agents and 
Confidential Agents ; IMiscellaneons Letters and Replies ; Notes 
to and from Foreign Legations. 

Van Buren Papers. Library of Congress. 

Webster Papers. Library of Congress. 

IL Contemporary Periodicals (for details consult the 
footnotes).^ 

United States : So far as they could be obtained, one newspaper of 
each party in each State for 1836, 1840-1844, and less systematic- 
ally 1845.* Tn most instances the papers were found; in some of 
the others the gaps were partially filled. Li the cases of Wash- 
ington and several other important cities use was made of an 
exceptional number of journals. Many valuable clippings from 
American papers, sent home by foreign agents, were discovered in 
the State Department. Contemporary magazines also were 
studied. 

Great Britain : The British Museum collection of newspapers and 
magazines w^as examined for the years 1836, 1840-1845. 

France : The newspapers and magazines in the Bibliotheque Na- 
tional were examined for the years 1836. 1840-1845. 

^ The list of periodicals examined is a very long one. To print it would 
appear to some pedantic, and as the periodicals used appear in every instance in 
the footnotes, it seems unnecessary. 

■• In making use of the newspapers two principal embarrassments have been 
experienced. In some cases the title of the journal included the name of the 
city or town where it was published, while in others it did not. It would seem 
proper to follow the usage in each particular instance : but sometimes the files 
are not themselves consistent, and a considerable number of papers have been 
found only through quotations in their contemporaries, which were not always 
accurate in this particular. To avoid confusion the name of the place is there- 
fore uniformly printed in Roman letters while the proper name of the paper is 
italicized. The other trouble arose from publication as dailies, tri-weeklies. semi- 
weeklies and weeklies. There were surprising irregularities in this regard. Cer- 
tain papers belonged now to one of these classes and now to another: some 
indicated their class in their titles, and in other cases ("particularly when only 
extracts could be foimd) the author was unable to ascertain to which class the 
particular issues from which he quoted actually belonged. Again, to employ the 
word " Daily " in one case and not in another might lead the reader to suppose 
that the latter belonged to a different class, whereas perhaps it was merely not 
the practice in the second instance to make the adjective a part of the name: 
and still other difficulties under this head might be mentioned. It has therefore 
seemed best, since the authority of the paper and not the frequency of its issue 
is the essential point, to omit uniformly " Daily," etc., except in a few special 
cases. Most of the newspapers cited may be found in the Library of Congress, 
and nearly all of the others in the Public Libraries of Boston, Nashville and 
Memphis, or the collection in the City Hall at New Orleans. 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 



473 



Mexico : The collections of newspapers in the Secretaria de Haci- 
enda, Biblioteca Nacional, and Archivo del Ayuntamiento de la 
Ciudad de Mexico, and fragmentary collections in nnmerous 
State and municipal archives were examined for the period 
treated. 

Texas : The author's main reliance was on the many clippings sent 
home by the representatives of foreign nations in Texas and the 
United States, quotations in American and British journals, and 
newspapers preserved in the State Library of Texas. 

III. Later Periodicals (see the footnotes). 

The historical serials of the countries named above were searched 
for documents and for articles, and the same course was followed 
with many not specially historical. Whatever useful material was 
found is referred to in the footnotes. 



IV. Books and Pamphlets. 

[To make a critical bibliography would add too much to the bulk 
and cost of this volume, and, as little use has been made of printed 
materials (aside from the history of Texas before the revolution) 
except for the documents they contain (criticised in the text if 
necessary), it seems uncalled for. This list is included (i) to pre- 
sent fuller titles than it seemed desirable to give in the footnotes, 
and (2) to indicate useful sources of information.] 



Adams, C. F., Jr. 
Charles Francis Adams. Boston. 
1900. 
Adams, E. D. 
British Interests and Activities in 
Texas. Baltimore. 1910. 
Adams, J. Q. 

Memoirs. 12 v. Phila. 1874-77. 
Alaman, L. 
Hist, de Mejico. ,5 v. Mejico. 
1849-52. 
Almonte, J. N. 

Noticia Estad. sobre Tejas. 
Mexico. 1835. 
Anti-Texas Legion. Albany. 1844. 
Benton, T. H. 

Abridgment of the Debates of 
Congress. 16 v. N. Y. 1857-60. 



Thirty Years' View. 2 v. N. Y. 
T856. 
Blaine, J. G. 

Twenty Years in Congress. 2 v. 
Norwich. 1884. 
Bocanegra, J. M. 

Disertacion Apologetica del Sist. 

Fed. Mexico. 1825. 
Memorias para la Hist, de Mexico. 
2 V. Mexico. 1892. 
Brown, J. H. 

History of Texas. St. Louis. 
Buchanan, James. 

Works (J. B. Moore, Ed.). 12 v. 
Phila. 1908-11. 
Buckingham, J. S. 
The Slave States of America. 2 v. 
London. 



474 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 



P.iistamantc, C. M. de. 

El Gabinete Mcxicano, etc. 2 v. 

Mexico. 1842. 
EI Gobierno del Gen. A. L. de S. 
Anna. ]\Iexico. 1845. 
Calhoun, J. C. 

Correspondence. See Jameson. 
Works (ed. In- Cralle). 6 v. 
N. Y. 1854. 
Channing, W. E. 

Works. 6 V. Boston. 1869. 
Child, D. L. 
The Taking of Naboth's Vineyard. 
N. Y. 1845- 
Clay, C. M. 

Autobiog. (V. i.) Cincinnati. 1886. 
Coleman, Chapman. 
Life of Crittenden. 2 v. Phila. 
187 1. 
Comunicaciones relat. a la Agreg. 

de Tejas, etc. Mexico. 1845. 
Cooper, T. V. 

Amer. Politics. Springfield. 
Crane, W. C. 

Sam Houston. Phila. 1884. 
Curtis, G. T. 

D. Webster. 2 v. N. Y. 1870. . 
Dawson, H. B. (Ed.). 

The Federalist. N. Y. 1897. 
Federacion y Tejas. Mexico. 1845. 
Foote, H S. 

Reminiscences. Washington. 1S74. 
Texas and the Texans. 2 v. 
Phila. 1 84 1. 
Garrison, G. P. 
Texas. Boston. 1903. 
Texas Diplomatic Corresp. 2 v. 

Washington. 1907, 191 t. 
Westward Extension. N. Y. 1906. 
Garrison, W. P. and F. J. 
Wm. Lloyd Garrison. 4 v. N. Y. 
1885. 
G. L. H., A Texian. 

Brief Remarks on Dr. Channing's 
Letter to Hon. Henry Clay. 
Boston. 1837. 
Greeley, Horace. 

American Conflict. 2 v. Hart- 
ford. T864. 



Recollections. N. Y. 1868. 
Slavery Extension. N. Y. 1856. 
Green, Duff. 
Facts and Suggestions. N. Y. 
1866. 
Hansard, T. C. 

Parliamentary Debates. 15 v. 
London. 1832-89. 
Harden, E. J. 
George M. Troup. Savannah. 
1859. 
Harvey, Peter. 
Reminiscences of Daniel Webster. 
Boston. 1877. 
Horton, R. G. 

James Buchanan. N. Y. 1856. 
Houstoun, Mrs. M. C. 
Texas and the Gulf of Mexico. 
2 v. London. 1844. 
Hunt, Gaillard. 

John C. Calhoun. Phila. 1907. 
Jameson, J. F. 

Calhoun's Correspondence (Am. 
Hist. Assoc, Annual Report for 
1899, Vol. ii.). 
Jay, William. 

Causes and Consequences of the 
Mexican War. Boston. 1849. 
Jenkins, J. S. 
James K. Polk. Auburn. 1850. 
Silas Wright. Auburn. 1847. 
Jollivet. 

.'\nnexion du Texas. Paris. 1844. 
Nouveaux Docs. Amer. Paris. 

T845. 
Jones, Anson. 

Letters Relating to the History of 
Annexation. 2 ed. Phila. 1852. 
Memoranda and Official Corre- 
spondence. N. Y. 1850. 
Kendall, Amos. 

Autobiography. Boston. 1872. 
Kendall, G. W. 
Texan Santa Fe Expedition. 2 v. 
N. Y. 1844. 
Kennedy, William. 

Texas. 2 ed. 2 v. London. 1841. 
La Camara de Repres. a la Nacion 
Mex. Mexico. 1845. 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 



475 



Lalor, J. J. 

Cyclopaedia of Political Science, 
etc. 3 V. Chicago. 1886. 
Lamar, M. B. 

Inaugural Address. Houston. 
1838. 
[Lester, C. E.] 

Sam Houston. Phila. 1866. 
Lettre d'un Citoyen de New-York. 

Paris. 1845. 
Lodge, H. C. 

Daniel Webster. P)Oston. 1899. 
Ludecus, Ed. 

Reise durcli . . . Tumalipas, Co- 
ahuila und Texas, etc. Leipzig. 
1837- 
Lundy, Benj. 

The War in Texas. 2 ed. Phila. 

1837. 
Mackenzie, W. L. 

Van Buren. Boston. 1846. 
McLaughlin, A. C. 

Lewis Cass. Boston. 1899. 
McMaster, J. B. 

Hist, of the U. S. 7 v. N. Y. 
]\Tadison, James. 

Writings (Hunt, Ed.). 8 v. N. Y. 
1908. 
Maillard, N. D. 

History of Texas. London. 1842. 
Mateos, J. A. 

Hist. Pari, de los Cong. Mex. 

ID V. Mexico. 1877-86. 
Maza, F. F. de la. 

Codigo de Colonizacion y Terrenos 
Baldios. Mexico. 1893. 
Meigs, W. M. 

Life of T. H. Benton. Phila. 
1904. 
Memoria . . . de Relaciones, etc. 

Mexico. 1845. 
Mexico a traves de los Siglos. 6 v. 

Mexico. 
Morse, J. T. 

J. Q. Adams. Boston. 1899. 
Onys, L. de. 

Memoria sobre los Negoc. entre 
Espana y los EE. UU., etc. 
Madrid. 1820. 



O Se hace la Guerra de Tejas, etc. 

Mex. 1845. 
Otero, Mariano. 

Cuestion Social y Politica. Mex. 
1842. 
Peck, C. H. 

Jacksonian Epoch. N. Y. 1899. 
Polk, J. K. 

Diary. 4 v. Chicago. 1910. 
Pracht, Victor. 
Texas im Jahre 1848. Elberfeld. 
1849. 
Prentiss, S. S. 

Memoir [ed. by his brother]. 2 v. 
N. Y. 1886. 
Quincy, Josiah. 

J. Q. Adams. Boston, i860. 
Raines, C. W. 

Bibliography of Texas. Austin. 
1896. 
Reeves, J. S. 
Amer. Diplomacy under Tyler and 
Polk. Baltimore. 1907. 
Revolutionary Officer. 

Considerations on the Propri. and 
Necess. of Annex. . . . Texas. 
N. Y. 1829. 
Richardson, J. D. 

Messages and Papers of the Presi- 
dents. 10 V. Washington. 1896. 
Roosevelt, Theodore. 

Thomas H. Benton. Boston. 1899. 
Sargent, Nathan. 

Public Men and Events. 2 v. 
Phila. 1875- 
Schouler, James. 
Hist, of the United States. 6 v. 
N. Y. 
Schurz, Carl. 

Henry Clay. 2 v. Boston. 1899. 
Sedgwick, Theodore. 

Thoughts, etc. N. Y. 1844. 
Seventy-second Anniv. of D. Web- 
ster's Birthday. 1854. 
Shepard, E. M. 

Martin Van Buren. Boston. 1899. 
Smith, Ashbel. 
Addresses. 1848 and 1875. 
Reminiscences. 1876. 



476 



ACCOUNT OF TTTF, SOURCRS. 



Smitliwick, Noah. 
The Evolution of a State. Austin. 
1901. 

Stanwood, Edward. 
Hist, of the Presidency. Boston. 
1898. 

Sumner, W. G. 
Andrew Jackson. Boston. 1899. 

Thompson, Waddy. 
Letter to National IntelHgencer. 
1844. 

Tornel, J. M. 

Breve Reseiia Hist. Mexico. 1852. 
Tejas y los EE. UU., etc. Mexico. 
1837- 

Treaties in Force, Compilation of. 
Washington. 1899. 

Turner Essays in History. By 
various authors. 1910. 

Tyler, L. G. 
Letters and Times of the Tylers. 
Richmond. 3 v. 1884-96. 

United States Congressional Docu- 
ments, including the Journals of 
Senate and House and the Execu- 
tive Journal of the Senate. 

Urgente Necesidad de la Guerra de 
Teias. Mexico. 1842. 



Visit to Texas. 2 ed. N. Y. 1836. 
Von Hoist, H. 

Const, and Polit. Hist, of the U. S. 

8 V. Chicago. 
John C. Calhoun. Boston. 1899. 
Webster, Daniel. 
Letters (Van Tyne). N. Y. 1902. 
Writings and Speeches. 18 v. 
Boston. 1903. 
Weed, Thurlow. 
Autobiography (H. A. Weed, Ed.). 
Boston. 1833. 
Winsor, Justin (Ed.). 

Narr. and Crit. Hist, of America. 
8 v. Boston. 1884-89. • 
Woodbury, Levi. 
Writings. 3 v. 
Wooten, D. G. 

Hist, of Texas. 
Yoakum, H. K. 

Hist. Texas. 2 
Young, A. W. 

American Statesman. 
N. Y. 1877- 
Zavala, L. de. 

Revoluciones de Mexico. 2 v 
Mexico. 



Boston. 1852. 

v^. Redfield. 1856. 
Rev. ed. 



LBAg'l2 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



014 614 771 9 #J 



